Making Elite Lawyers:  Visions of Law at Harvard and Beyond by Cohen, Daniel A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 6 
1994 
Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at Harvard and Beyond 
Daniel A. Cohen 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel A. Cohen, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at Harvard and Beyond, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1737 
(1994). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol92/iss6/24 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MAKING ELITE LA WYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARV ARD AND BE-
YOND. By Robert Granfield. New York: Routledge, Chapman and 
Hall. 1992. Pp. 248. $27.50. 
"What is it like to be a bat?" Thomas Nagel once mused, trying to 
comprehend the nature of bat consciousness.1 In Making Elite Law-
yers Robert Granfield2 ponders an only slightly less provocative ques-
tion: What is it like to be a Harvard law student? 
Bats emit an endless series of high-pitched shrieks to navigate their 
way around a vast, dark cave, flap their wings constantly as their bod-
ies blindly glide past each other, chew up helpless insects, and strew 
guano across the cave floor. Harvard law students, according to 
Granfield, lose their moral vision as they grope through a demanding 
first-year curriculum in which they learn the art of legal argument, 
spend their second year flying across the country in search of suitable 
employment, and depart after their third year to serve the values and 
interests of the corporate marketplace. Not much different from being 
a bat. 
Granfield explores the development of Harvard law students' legal 
consciousness in order to identify the links between their highly liberal 
legal education and their highly conservative employment decisions. 
According to Granfield, the central paradox of Harvard Law School is 
that 
the law school contains perhaps the largest contingent of Critical Legal 
Scholars in the country and has one of the only public interest placement 
centers in the country . . . . In many ways, the atmosphere within 
Harvard Law School suggests an orientation that would be consistent 
with the promotion of social justice careers and values. 
All of this is very confusing particularly when so many students from 
Harvard accept legal positions in large corporate law firms. The envi-
ronment is liberal and to the left while the occupational decisions that 
students make are corporate-oriented. [p. 43] 
By what strange tum of events does a faculty with such an allegedly 
strong "crit" influence produce such highly conformist and proestab-
lishment graduates? In essence, Granfield concludes that, by and 
large, the Harvard law faculty successfully grinds students down, 3 to 
the point at which few have the moral and psychological strength to 
resist the siren song of corporate practice. 
Granfield calls his work "ethnographic" (p. 11). The book derives 
from studies conducted between 1985 and 1988 at Harvard Law 
1. THOMAS NAGEL, What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 165-80 (1979). 
2. Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Denver. 
3. As in the student's motto, i/legitimus non carborundum - don't let the bastards grind you 
down. See GEORGE J. ROTH, SLAYING THE LAW SCHOOL DRAGON 5 (1st ed. 1980). 
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School. During this time Granfield engaged in "participant observa-
tion;" that is, he attended classes. He also conducted 103 in-depth 
interviews with students and obtained responses from several hundred 
questionnaires (p. 11). But Granfield was perhaps more observer than 
participant: although he attended classes, he apparently neither en-
rolled as a law student nor prepared for classes by reading the assigned 
material.4 
Central to Granfield's arguments are Chapters Four and Five, in 
which he discusses the nature and effects of legal education (pp. 51-
93), and Chapter Nine, in which he examines the means by which 
Harvard law students rationalize their corporate employment deci-
sions (pp. 143-67). The present discussion focuses on the content of 
these chapters, although Chapters Six through Eight - which ad-
dress, respectively, the experiences of women, the experiences of work-
ing-class students, and the collective internalization of "elite" attitudes 
- also contain much interesting material (pp. 94-142). 
Granfield argues that "[d]uring their law schooling, most students 
replace a justice-oriented consciousness with a game-oriented con-
sciousness" (p. 52). This replacement occurs through several interre-
lated steps. First, students must master a congeries of difficult legal 
concepts: "promissory estopp[e]l, contractual consideration, res ips[a] 
loquitur, res judicata, and fee-tail" (p. 53). The process of mastering 
this congeries "undermines radical thought by teaching a logic and 
vocabulary that isolates students from social contexts" (p. 53). Sec-
ond, students learn "to justify their opinions on legal grounds as op-
posed to ideological or substantive ones" (p. 55). Third, students learn 
to draw connections between seemingly unrelated cases (p. 56). 
Fourth, and finally, students learn how to make legal arguments. In 
the words of one student, legal education reduces to this: "[T]eachers 
ask us to discuss the holding of a case and then ask us to distinguish it 
from other cases and then force us to argue the other side. We are 
taught how to flip arguments and how to maneuver around principles" 
(p. 58). 
Not surprisingly, Granfield concludes that such a pedagogical ex-
perience induces cynicism about the law. One student comments: 
I originally had a very idealistic view of the law. I think now that it 
was a limited view .... I thought that there were some problems but that 
you could use political arguments to make changes, like in criminal law 
or civil rights. If you made a just or moral argument you would win. 
That's not the case though. [p. 62] 
"Justice-oriented" idealism has thus evaporated in the face of the reali-
zation that "[t]he whole thing is just a game" (p. 63). Realization that 
legal argument consists merely of distinguishing cases and "wea-
sel[ing] around principles" (p. 63) and that one can argue for either 
4. Granfield provides a more complete discussion of his methodology at pp. 209-14. 
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side of any proposition with equal facility disabuses these students of 
the notion that legal argument produces substantively just decisions. 
Instead, Granfield concludes, students come to see law as "nothing 
more than a game performed by practitioners for the sake of being 
victorious" (p. 63). 
So far, Granfield treads heavily on cliche. More provocative is the 
link Granfield perceives between this jaded appreciation of legal argu-
ment and an orientation toward corporate practice. Granfield believes 
that rigid pedagogical insistence on emotional and moral distance 
from the cases studied forges this crucial bond (pp. 75-78). Professors 
mock students who focus on political, ethical, or moral arguments 
when instead they should absorb the doctrinal lessons of the case at 
hand and focus on the technical aspects of winning a case (pp. 76-77). 
In tum, students come to find that their own pre-law-school views 
about various social issues were naive and "markedly inferior to their 
newly honed legal views" (p. 83). Law students not only acquire the 
skill to advocate any legal position whatsoever, but they also learn 
"that they [are] ethically bound to represent interests that may be at 
variance with their own values" (p. 84). Once students internalize this 
professional identity of the lawyer as amoral technician and advocate, 
they are psychologically and morally prepared to represent interests 
that previously seemed foreign or repugnant - particularly corporate 
interests. 
Granfield's account no doubt contains much truth. Still, his perva-
sive moralism deserves a skeptical response. In a nutshell, Granfield 
maintains that legal education teaches students to replace "moral" ar-
gument with "legal" argument, suggesting that moral reasoning has 
no role to play in legal argument. Granfield insinuates as well that 
students learn to believe that all legal arguments are created equal -
none is in principle superior to any other. Making Elite Lawyers, in 
short, would have one believe that Harvard law professors are utterly 
indifferent to the quality of the arguments presented, caring only that 
arguments are made and then "flipped." 
Granfield apparently discounts the possibility that legal education 
- even at Harvard Law School - is partly an enterprise in distin-
guishing good arguments from bad, based not only on "technical" 
considerations but also on the arguments' underlying moral assump-
tions and implications. Granfield likewise filters out any suggestion 
that legal education, at least at an "elite" institution like Harvard, 
consists not simply in learning to "flip" arguments but also - and 
perhaps more prevalently - in systematically studying problems of 
institutional design: what social needs legal institutions can serve or 
should serve, how law structures human behavior, what social costs a 
legal regime itself imposes, and so on. 5 
S. For example, one type of student voice Granfield filters out is the kind expressed in CHRIS 
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These criticisms suggest that Granfield has provided a rather in-
complete picture of the type of professional identity that "elite" insti-
tutions such as Harvard Law School construct. Of course, the 
possibility remains that Harvard law students are generally apathetic 
to much of what Harvard law professors are trying to teach: profes-
sors may believe they are teaching the theory of tort or contract law, 
say, but students only take away the message that arguments are made 
to be flipped. Granfield's own approach, however, seems too selective 
in its material to shed any light on this issue. 
Regarding the students' tendency to join corporate law firms, 
Granfield points to some obvious culprits: the seductions of the corpo-
rate law firm recruitment process (pp. 135-38), the obsequious treat-
ment Harvard law students receive from recruiters (pp. 135-36), and 
the need to get out from under oppressive law school debt (pp. 151-
53). Of greater interest is the gloss the students put on their own ca-
reer choices. 
Committed to public interest in theory, Harvard law students ap-
parently disdain it in practice. Sample student comments include: 
In 99.9 percent of the cases in poverty stuff the results are limited. I 
don't anymore see that change will come this way . 
. . . [M]y first summer I worked in a public defender[']s office and it 
was terrible. I don't think you can really accomplish much of anything 
working someplace like that. 
I used to think that social change would come about by being an 
activist .... But you really can't accomplish much by doing this. [pp. 
153-55] 
These grim prospects drive students with an ostensible public in-
terest orientation into the arms of eager firms. Some justify their deci-
sions in terms of pro bono opportunities: "I think I can do more good 
for people if I commit myself to working with community groups or 
activities in the bar during my spare time" (p. 88). Others believe they 
cannot become effective agents for social change without obtaining the 
credentials, training, and connections large law firms offer (pp. 155-
56). Finally, many simply deny that they have lost their ideals by dis-
tinguishing themselves from their imagined antithesis, the "corporate 
tool." Two students express this view memorably: 
I don't believe I'm a corporate tool. I'm working for a large firm but 
I don't think it's against my principles, which are left-oriented .... Peo-
ple who are corporate tools are politically right wing and have a vested 
interest in upholding that power structure. Corporate tools seek to up-
hold that power structure in an affirmative way and come here to learn 
GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALISf AT YALE LAW 
SCHOOL 68-83, 155-76 (1991), which recounts Guido Calabresi's classroom discussions of the 
purposes, limits, and social effects of tort Jaw. 
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to do that. I'm not a corporate tool. I intend to work on the right side 
of the cases I'll be involved in. I'm going to make deals, not fuck people 
over. [p. 161] 
I wouldn't want to be a corporate litigator because they're just tools. 
The myth is that all corporate firms are cut-throat. That myth comes 
from litigation departments. As a corporate litigator you have to take 
the side that your client is on, regardless of what it might be. In corpo-
rate transactions lawyers are mediators, they bring people together. Cor-
porate lawyers aren't like corporate litigators. They're not charlatans. I 
don't think I'm a corporate tool. I think you're a corporate tool if you 
do corporate litigation, not corporate law. [p. 162] 
The tenacity with which these students hold on to the belief that they 
have not "sold out" to the establishment is fascinating; one wonders 
whether they made similar comments three years earlier in justifying 
their decision to attend Harvard Law School. 
Although Granfield provides a reasonably illuminating analysis of 
the strategies by which students with an avowed public interest orien-
tation justify their corporate employment decisions, his field of inquiry 
is disappointingly limited. Granfield, for instance, seems insufficiently 
critical about the depth of the avowed commitment itself. Granfield 
provides no information about the prelaw or law school activities of 
his subjects; consequently, the reader has no basis for judging whether 
these students ever had a genuine public interest orientation in the first 
place. 
Granfield's surveys of students' attitudes, while informative, also 
seem insufficiently fine-grained. For example, Granfield surveys stu-
dents on their shift in political attitudes during law school along the 
lines of "more radical," "same," or "more conservative" (p. 44). 
Granfield likewise surveys students on changes in their degree of inter-
est in pro bono work along the lines of "more interested," "same," or 
"less interested" (p. 44). Such broad questions reveal comparatively 
little about the impact of a Harvard legal education on student atti-
tudes. Consider, by way of contrast, a study of corporate attorneys 
conducted by the sociologist Robert Nelson.6 Nelson surveyed law-
yers' responses to statements such as: 
There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large com-
panies for the good of the country. 
On the whole, society is better off when the government does not attempt 
to regulate the economy through such legal instruments as the antitrust 
laws, securities regulation, banking law, and consumer protection. 
Doctrines and rules pertaining to class actions should be interpreted to 
6. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 236-43 (1988). 
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permit liberal use of the class action technique. 7 
A similar survey by Granfield would have provided a basis for a much 
more sensitive analysis of the impact of a Harvard legal education on 
its students' attitudes. 
Finally, Granfield's study has an unfortunately limited scope. 
Granfield focuses on the first job Harvard law students accept upon 
graduation. Although methodological constraints no doubt justify 
this focus, it nonetheless provides an inadequate basis for determining 
what social contribution - if any - Harvard law graduates make 
toward advancement of public interest work and social justice issues. 
How long do these graduates remain in the private sector? How many 
of them subsequently enter the public sector or join public interest 
organizations? What are the pro bono practice profiles of graduates 
who remain in the private sector? What civic responsibilities do they 
assume? Although the answers to these questions necessarily lie be-
yond the scope of Granfield's "ethnographic" study, they bear directly 
on the accuracy of his assessments. 
Making Elite Lawyers, in sum, makes a nice start toward under-
standing the evolution of legal consciousness at an elite law school and 
its impact on legal practice. Given the book's methodological short-
comings, however, the jury is still out on whether Harvard Law 
School single-handedly turns decent, public-minded citizens into 
bloodsucking vampires or merely harmless fruit bats. 
- Daniel A. Cohen 
7. Id. at 237. 
